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THE ADMISSIBILITY OF DECLARATIONS OF THE
ASSURED IN LIFE INSURANCE LITIGATION

T

mi question whether an insured's declarations or admissions are admissible against the beneficiary is one presented profusely in litigations between beneficiary and
insured. It arises in an attempt by the defendant insurance
company to prove either fraud in the inception of the contract, the breach of a condition precedent to the issuance of
the policy or the breach of a condition subsequent to the
issuance thereof-a type of defense which also gives rise to
another question, namely, how far, if at all, confidential
communications between physician and patient are admissible in evidence to prove this type of defense? Herein consideration will be given to the first question.
Although in the various jurisdictions there is a dearth
of symphony, the prime reason for this seems to be due to a
failure of the earlier reports to present all the crucial facts
and the careless verbiage therein coupled with the usual
plethora of generalities which seem to be the common heritage of the advocate.
At the outset it is feasible to define a "vested interest"
as that phrase is applied to a beneficiary's property rights in
a life insurance policy. A vested interest is an interest
which a beneficiary of an insurance policy has, by virtue
of which the insured cannot under the terms of the policy
change the beneficiary, or if by the terms thereof he may be
changed, a change has not been made by the insured during
his lifetime.' From the very nature of things attention need
not be focused on any vested interest a beneficiary may derive solely by virtue of the death of the insured without a
change -of beneficiary. Apparently, the earliest case in the
reports of this state pertinent to the issue to which consideration is now being given is the case of Rawls v. American
Mutual Life Insurance Company.2 It is cited copiously in

'Smith v. National Benefit Society, 123 N. Y. 85, 25 N. E. 197 (1890);
Eltonhead v. Travelers Ins. Co., 177 App. Div. 170, 163 N. Y. Supp. 838 (1st
Dept. 1917); Ecker v. Myer, 18 Misc. 356, 194 N. Y. Supp. 320 (1922);
see also 37 C. J. §345.
227 N. Y. 282 (1863).
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all the subsequent cases. In form the policy purported to
have been procured by the insured. The court admitted this
fact and said that the policy would nevertheless be treated
as really being effected by the plaintiff-beneficiary assigning
the following reasons: (1) The plaintiff applied for the policy and obtained it as the creditor of the alleged insured to
protect his interests as such creditor. (2) The plaintiff,
after taking the initial steps for the procural of the policy,
paid the premiums (initial as well as all subsequent). (3)
The application for the policy, as distinguished from the policy itself, stated it to be for the benefit of the plaintiff. (4)
Finally, the policy was delivered to the creditor. The policy,
in view of all these facts, could be treated as giving rise to a
contract between insurer and creditor rather than between
insurer and debtor. The company offered evidence of the
declarations of the insured made after the issuance of the
policy relative to his condition prior to its issuance, so as to
prove fraud in the inception. The court said, per Wright, J.,
"Fish" (the debtor and insured) "was not after the issuing
of the policy in suit, a party in interest in that contract., and
could make no statement or admission that would divest the
rights of the plaintiff. He was not in any manner the
agent of the plaintiff, after the issuing of the policy and
could not bind him." In so far as the court intimates in the
last sentence that a possible ground of exclusion is the lack
of agency we cannot concur, for declarations are often admitted as admissions or declarations against interest, even
though no agency exists and, in the latter case or instance,
even though no privity exists.' It is to be noted that inasmuch as the insurance contract was deemed to have taken
place between creditor and insurer, there was, a fortiori, no
assignment of any contract rights or choses in action; thus,
in this type of case, there is no abrogation of the familiar
doctrine of Paige v. Cagutin4 and other cases r, to the effect
'Livingston v. Arnoux, 56 N. Y. 50 (1874); Martorella v. Prud. Life
Ins. Co., 238 App. Div. 532, 264 N. Y. Supp. 751 (4th Dept. 1933); Humes v.
O'Bryan and Washington, 74 Ala. 64 (1883); German Ins. Co. v. Bartlet,
188 Il. 165, 58 N. E. 1075 (1900); County of Mahashka v. Ingalls, 16 Iowa

81 (1864).

'7 Hill 361 (N. Y. 1843).
'Wagner v. Grimm, 169 N. Y. 421, 62 N. E. 569 (1902); Kelly v. Bears,
194 N. Y. 60, 86 N. E. 985 (1909); Tierney v. Fitzpatrick, 195 N. Y. 433,
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that declarations of a donor, vendor, or assignor of a chattel
or chose in action, whether made before or after the transfer,
are inadmissible to effect the claim or title of the donee,
vendee, assignee or any subsequent holder. Let us see, however, how this doctrine works out in other cases.
Chronologically, the next case is Mulner v. Guardian
Life Insurance Company.6 As distinguished from the preceding, in the principal case the policy purported to be payable to Florence Mulner (the assured's wife) and to the
assured's children. It does not specifically appear whether
the assured reserved the right to change the beneficiary.
However, that no right to change the beneficiary existed and
that the beneficiary's interest was vested may be inferred for
the court in the principal case based its decision solely upon
the above passage from Rawls v. Mutual Life Insurance Company (supra), as evidenced by the fact that the court quoted
it and immediately preceding the quotation thereof said
that it "seems to cover the question presented." The declarations of the assured sought to be introduced in evidence in
the principal case were made after the issuance of the policy
and the vesting of the beneficiary's interest.
The case of Mulner v. Guardian Life Insurance Company was followed by that of Swift v. Mutual Life Insurance Company.Ia Here, unlike the preceding two cases,
we have declarations of the insured sought to be introduced in evidence made before the issuance of the policy and thus before the vesting of beneficiary's interest.
Whether this interest was vested or contingent at the time
of the issuance of the policy is immaterial; therefore no
harm ensues in this instance from the fact that the case as
reported does not reveal whether the insured had the right
to change the beneficiary or not. In this case a witness was
called by the defense, who testified that, prior to (that is
not less than six months before) the application for the
policy was made, he noticed that the insured was not looking
very well, and that he walked lame, and inquired of him
88 N. E. 750 (1909); Scheps v. Bowery Savings Bank, 97 App. Div. 434,
90 N. Y. Supp. 26 (2d Dept. 1904); Durnebeil v. Ringer, 101 Misc. 658, 167
N. Y. Supp. 952 (1917).

1 N. Y. S. C. (T. & C.) 448.

O 63 N. Y. 186 (1875).
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what was the matter. The witness was thereupon asked to
state what answers the assured gave him. This was objected
to and the lower court sustained the objection. Similarly,
another witness testified that nearly a year prior to the application he saw a sore on the right side of the insured. The
witness was then asked if the insured told him what was the
cause of it; what kind of sore he called it. This, too, was
objected to as hearsay, and inadmissible. Upon appeal it
was held that none of the objections were sustainable, since
the declarations of one whose life has been insured for the
benefit of another made (a) as to his state of health, and
(b) at a time prior to and not remote from his application
for insurance, and (c) in connection with facts or acts exhibiting his state of health, are receivable in evidence where the
issue was as to his knowledge of his own bodily state at that
time. The court, per Folger, J., attempted to explain the
underlying theory of the preceding cases in the following
language: "There are decisions that declarations made after
the contract of insurance has been effected, may not be put
in evidence but they are upon the intelligible reason, that
after the contract of insurance has been effected, the subject
of insurance has no such relation to the holder of the policy
as gives him power to destroy or affect it by unsworn statements. Mulner v. GuardianLife Ins. Co., 1 N. Y. S. C. (T. &
C.) 448; Washington Life Ins. Co., 10 Kansas 525; Rawls v.
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 27 N. Y. 282." While in the initial part
of the passage the court commits itself to the use of the
"careless verbiage," to which reference has been made at the
beginning of this article, by intimating that an insured's
declarations after the issuance of the policy are ineffectual
and inadmissible against a beneficiary; 7 yet it is right in its
intimation, in the latter part of the above passage, to the
effect that the test is whether the beneficiary's rights can be
destroyed by the insured.
It is to be noted that there is no invocation in the immediately preceding case of the doctrine that the declarations
of a donor, vendor, or assignor of a chattel or a chose in
action, whether made before or after the transfer, are inadSee post; Smith v. National Benefit Society, mtpra note 1; Ward v.
New York Life Ins. Co., 225 N. Y. 314, 122 N. E. 207 (1919).
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missible to affect the claim or title of the donee, vendee or
assignee or of any subsequent holder. Nor is this doctrine
invoked in the immediately succeeding cases, the exclusion of
the insured's statements therein being upon other grounds
to be discussed.
The case of Edington v. Mutual Life Insurance Company 8 was decided after the case just discussed and distinguishes it. The facts were as follows: The insured took
out a policy on his own life, payable to himself and later
assigned it to the plaintiff. The declarations sought to be
introduced in evidence were of three kinds, to wit: (a) those
made in a prior application to another insurance company;
(b) those made to some physicians who treated the insured;
(c) and those made to some laymen. All these declarations
were made prior to the issuance of the policy and application. The declarations made in the application to the said
other insurance company were made two months prior to the
issuance of the policy upon which the plaintiff brought his
action. Although made before the application for the policy
principally in issue, it does not appear exactly how many
months before, the other two kinds of declarations were
made. It was held that none of these three kinds of declarations were admissible because, unlike those declarations in
issue in the case of Swift v. Mutual Life Insurance Company
(supra), they did not accompany some act or fact exhibiting
the insured's state of health. For examples of such "act"
or "fact" in the latter case we had a limping by the insured
and also the sore on the right side of the insured. The declarations of the insured sought to be introduced in evidence
characterized this limping and the sore or soreness. The
court expresses itself thus, in laying down the rule: "When
declarations are made not too long before the application
and examination and when a part of the res gestae of some
act or fact exhibiting a condition of health which they legitimately tend to explain, they are admissible to show knowledge in the insured of his physical condition." Unfortunately, the court uses the term "res gesfae" in a very loose
sense. By tne term mres gestae' here the court does not
mean a spontaneous uncontrolled exclamation occurring
867 N. Y. 185 (1876).
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simultaneously with or immediately after the infliction of

an injury, as that term is used in decisions 9 involving negligence actions and when so conceived or used the appellation
"verbal acts" given the exclamation. In the .sense in which
the court uses the term, declarations of pain and suffering,
as for example those declarations sought to be divulged in
the principal case, would be admissible even though they do
not constitute "verbal acts," provided these declarations of
pain and suffering-which are distinguishable from groans,
moans, shrieks, etc.; the latter being denominated "c.xpressions" of pain and suffering-accompany some "act" or
"fact," such as the limping or soreness of the side referred
to above in connection with the case of Swift v. Mutual Life
Insrance Company (supra). ° This is always the rule in
life insurance litigations between beneficiary and insurer,
since at the time they come up for trial the insured will
always be found to have made his demise."1 But because in
litigations involving accident insurance the insured is not
always dead at the time of trial the above rule is not always
the one applied. Thus, in the latter type of litigations, if
the declarant (the insured) is alive, his declarations of pain
and suffering are not admissible except:
A--when they are made to a physician for the purpose
of treatment, even though they do not constitute
"verbal acts," 12 provided they are of present pain
and suffering; 13
B-when made at the time of the injury so as to be

"verbal acts."

14

'For examples of how the term "res gestae" is used in negligence cases
see: Waldele v. N. Y. Cent. R. R., 95 N. Y. 274 (1884); Butler v. Manhattan
R. R., 143 N. Y. 417, 38 N. E. 454 (1894); People v. Del Vermo, 192 N. Y.
470, 85 N. E. 690 (1908) ; Greener v. Gen. Electric, 209 N. Y. 135, 102 N. E.

527 (1913).

"See Tromblee v. North Amer. Acc. Ins. Co., 173 App. Div. 174, 158 N.
Y. Supp. 1014 (3rd Dept. 1916).
Ibid.
'Matteson v. N. Y. Cent. R. R., 35 N. Y. 487 (1866) ; Roche v. Brooklyn
City etc. R. R., 105 N. Y. 294, 11 N. E. 630 (1887); Barber v. Merriam, 11
Allen 322 (Mass. 1865) ; Fay v. Harlan, 128 Mass. 244 (1880).
'Davidson v. Cornell, 132 N. Y. 228, 30 N. E. 573 (1892); Towle v.
Blake, 48 N. H. 92 (1868).
" Caldwell v. Murphy, 11 N. Y. 416 (1854); Werely v. Person's, 28 N. Y.
344 (1863) ; Matteson v. N. Y. Cent. R. R., 35 N. Y. 487 (1866) ; Hagenlacker
v. Coney Island & Brooklyn R. R., 99 N. Y. 136, 1 N. E. 536 (1885).

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

In other words, in life insurance litigations since from
the very nature of life-insurance contracts, death of the
insured (the declarant must always ensue before a cause of
action arises, consideration need never be given to the question whether these declarations of pain and suffering were
made under the circumstances related in the above captions
"A" and "B". Conversely, since from the very nature of
accident insurance policies death need not always ensue before a cause of action accrues against the insurance company.
Sometimes, when the insured has not passed on, consideration must be given to the question whether the insured's
declarations were made under the circumstances indicated
in the aforementioned captions.
Casting aside for the moment the many other restrictions referred to or to be referred to, it is apparent from'
what has been said that in every life or accident insurance
litigation he who seeks to introduce the insured's declarations in evidence must always ask himself, among the many
other questions which the introduction of such evidence calls
for, the following two: Are the declarations admissible at
all against the beneficiary? If they are, of what type must
they, in addition, be before they are admitted? In answering the last question the inquirer must determine whether
the declarant has died. If he has-which is always the case
in these life insurance litigations-it need not be shown they
were made as a part of the "res gestae" in the strict and
orthodox sense or made to a physician. If he has not-which
is often the case in accident insurance litigations--then the
conditions indicated under the above captions (A and B)
must be present. 5
As intimated, a distinction should always be kept in
mind between "declarations" of pain and suffering and "expressions" of pain and suffering, such as groans, shrieks, etc.
As to the latter, consideration will not be given in this
article, for in the vast majority of litigations between beneficiary and insured, if not in all, the defendant insurance
company seeks to introduce evidence of the former only.
From the case of Swift v. Mutual Life Insurance Company (supra) and the case of Mulner v. GuardianLife Insur'See

Tromblee v. North Amer. Acc. Ins. Co., suzPra note 10.
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ante Company (supra) we gather that the declarations of the
insured, in addition to other requisites, must not be too remote. We have seen thus far that declarations made nearly a
year prior to the issuance of the policy have been held not too
remote. 16 In the case of Edington v. Mutual Life Insurance
Company there was a primary reason herein referred to
(ante.), for excluding all the declarations of the insured
and this reason was, as indicated, recognized and applied
as to all of them. A secondary ground, for the preclusion
of the insured's declarations, was enunciated by the court
therein. This, however, was applied only to the statements
made by the insured to his physicians and the laymen heretofore mentioned, the court saying that they were too remote.
However correct this deduction may be on the part of the
court, as to these statements, the period of remoteness by
day, month or year is not indicated in the case as reported.
In the case of Ditleber v. Home Life Insurance Company,1a as in the immediate succeeding case,' 7 the policy
provided for alternate beneficiaries, their right to the proceeds thereof being contingent upon the survival of one or
more of them at the time set for the accrual of the policy.
In the former case the plaintiff took out a policy in the
defendant insurance company, upon the life of her husband,
payable to him on the fourteenth day of August, 1902, if he
then should be living, but, in case of death before that time,
payable to her. It does not appear whether a right to change
the beneficiary was reserved--or, in other words, whether the
beneficiary's interest was vested or not. But this is immaterial since the declarations of the plaintiff's husband, one
of the beneficiaries, was made prior to the issuance of the
policy.'
It was held that the declarations of the plaintiff's
husband were admissible to show that he had knowledge of
the existence of a pulmonary disease prior to the making of
the application for the policy, "the fact being otherwise
proved."
By the immediately preceding and italicized phrase,
:'Swift v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 63 N. Y. 186 (1875).

"- 69 N. Y. 264 (1877).
Smith v. Mut. Benefit Society, supra note 1.

'7

Ibid.
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the court in Delliber v. Home Life Insurance Company 1Sa
does not suggest, indicate or create a new restriction upon
the admissibility of the declarations of an insured against a
beneficiary. That it is necessary that a foundation for the
declarations be laid by the introduction of evidence apart
from the declarations of the. insured, showing that the insured actually had the disease in question, is also made
patent by prior cases. 19
By the terms of the policy upon which suit was brought
in the case of Smith v. National Benefit Society 2 0 the defendant insurance company constituted the insured "a benefit
member" of the "society," and agreed "to pay Fred. H.
Smith, if living, if not to the heirs at law of said member,"
the sum insured. Prior to the issuance of the policy the
insured (the debtor) had made many declarations evincing
an intent to defraud the insurer by committing suicide. The
court said: "These acts and declarations all occurred before
the plaintiff took his policy as collateral." Although the
laws of 1883, section 18, applicable only to mutual-benefitsociety contracts of insurance, gave the insured the right to
change the beneficiary, the statute did not prevent a contract between the parties by force of which a vested interest
passed to the beneficiary, such being the situation in the
principal case. But said the court: "Granting, however,
that such was the relation between the parties, we are still
of the opinion that no material errors were shown by the
record, since all the evidence to which objection was made
came fairly within the res gestae and the rule permitting
proof of the actual transaction involved in the issue. * * *
The declarations must be made at the time of the act done
which they are supposed to characterize; they must be calculated to unfold the nature and quality of the facts which
they intend to explain, and they must so harmonize with the
facts so as to form one transaction."
The iNew York Life Insurance Company, in a subsequent case, 2 ' issued a policy on the life of one Ward in the
'"a Supra note 16a.

" Edington v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 5 Hun 1 (N. Y. 1876), rev'd, 67 N. Y.
185 (1876) ; Swift v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., supra note 16. (In the latter case
not so clearly.)
'Supra note 1.
'Ward v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., supra note 7.
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sum of $5,000, payable on the death of the insured to his
"executors, administrations or assigns."
The policy contained the now popular provision that the insured might at
any time change the beneficiary under the said policy by a
written notice and endorsement of the change on the policy
by the company. After the insured's death we have opposing
claimants to the proceeds of the policy, as beneficiaries-a
situation not appearing in any of the aforementioned cases.
This being so, the court was called upon to decide an additional question, not involved in the preceding cases. This
was whether the insured's sons, whose claims as beneficiaries
were opposed by the insured's wife, and whose claims the
company recognized as the only legitimate ones, derived
their "title and interest from, through or under" the insured,
as that phrase is used in section 347 of the Civil Practice
Act. It is to be noted that neither of the opposing claimants
were originally designated beneficiaries and that one of them
(the insured's wife) claimed that her designation was prior
in point of time. The court confined itself, however,
almost entirely to the aforementioned question, it assuming
that no other objection lay against the insured's declarations
and holding that the declarations of the insured made after
the issuance of the policy and antedating the designation of
either of the alleged beneficiaries were admissible. The reasons assigned were that the situation is the same as that
which exists where a grant or devise is made of a power, for,
whatever be the technical source of title of a grantee under
a power of appointment, it cannot be denied that in reality
and substance it is the execution of the power that gives to
the grantee the property passing under it; yet with very
few exceptions it is the rule that the title of a grantee
under a power of appointment comes from the donor of the
power rather than from the one who exercises it. This commentary was accompanied by the following language, per
Hiscock, Ch. J.: "The great body of authority makes it
plain, by inference at least, that when Section 829,22 speaks
of deriving title or interest 'from, through or under' a deceased person it contemplates property or an interest which
'Now §347, N. Y. C. P. A.
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belonged to the deceased in his lifetime, 23 and the title to
which passed by assignment or otherwise through him to
the party who is protected by the section. These authorities
do not contemplate a case where a party claims property
from a third person which never belonged to the deceased
and in fact did not come into existence until his death."
It is submitted that when the insured takes out a policy
payable originally to himself or his estate, as in the principal
case, and then assigns the policy to a beneficiary, the latter
takes "through, under or from" the insured. Confessedly,
the converse is the situation, which was not the one in the
principal case, where the beneficiary takes a vested interest,
he being the original beneficiary and there being no power
to change him. In such case, it is submitted, he is not identified in interest with the insured. The beneficiary obtains no
title to anything "from or under" the insured, nor is the
insured the agent of the beneficiary. The beneficiary by the
creation of the contract obtains a separate and individual
right, in such a case, as a third party entitled to sue upon
the contract in his own name. That right comes directly from
the insurance company and not from the insured. The insured may have purchased and paid for the insurance, but
the beneficiary does not obtain it from him. He may be a
charitable stranger, but he, nevertheless, is a stranger.
Again, the holding that the beneficiaries whom the company recognized did not take title "from, through or under"
the insured was one that was not strictly necessary, for the
court itself admits that even had the evidence, sought to be
introduced on behalf of the insured's wife (the appellant) as
to her transactions and communications with the deceased
insured, been admitted by the court below, still, as a matter
of law, she would have to establish that she was an assignee
of the policy in question.
Furthermore, in so far as the Ward case .holds that the
beneficiaries whom the company recognized did not take title
or interest, "through, under or from" the insured, upon prin' There is no doubt that the insured did possess a chose in action against
the insurer, prior to his designation of the opposing claimants as beneficiaries.
The statute does not make a discrimination between kinds of interest that are
derived "through, under or from" the deceased. * * * that is, between money
and choses in action, both of which are property.
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ciple it is hard to reconcile, or, rather, to discover, what
additional ingredients are found in the following cases,
which prompts a different holding, bearing in mind that the
mere fact that in the principal case a contract of insurance
was involved, is not of itself sufficient to warrant it. In the
cases cited below,2 4 it was held that the holder of a note
suing the maker or another liable for its payment is a person
deriving title or interest from the payee or an intermediate
holder since deceased, and is protected against testimony as
to transactions or communications with such deceased tending to establish a defense to such an action. Again, in the
following cases,2 5 where a mortgage on real property was
assigned, the assignor having died, it was held that the
assignee of the mortgage (a mere chose in action, something
which the insured in the principal case possessed before the
purported designation of the conflicting claimants or beneficiaries) derives title both from his immediate assignor and
a prior assignor of the instrument. In fact, in such mortgage cases, it has even been held that where the controversy
involves the right of title to the instrument, the assignee of
the mortgage 26does not derive title to the instrument from
the morgagor.
It is feasible to state here, that, though a holding relative thereto was not strictly necessary, the case of Ward v.
New York Life Insurance Company (supra) apparently is
the first in this state to interpret and decide upon the aforementioned phrase in the Civil Practice Act, as applied to
opposing claimants to the proceeds of life insurance policies,
the insured being the deceased. Below 27 are some cases
' Sallade v. Gerlack, 54 Hun 635, 7 N. Y. Supp. 181 (N. Y. 1889), aff'd,
132 N. Y. 548, 30 N. E. 372 (1892); Wagner v. Grimm, 169 N. Y. 421, 430,
62 N. E. 569 (1902); Benedict v. Driggs, 34 Hun 94 (N. Y. 1884); Becker v.
Hart, 135 App. Div. 785, 791, 120 N. Y. Supp. 270 (2d Dept. 1909) (proposition
in dissenting opinion but not contrary to prevailing opinion) ; see also GREENFIELD, TSTIMONY UNDER SECTION 347 C. P. A.-§§143, 144.
'Smith v. Cross, 90 N. Y. 549 (1882) ; Auburn Savings Bank v. Brinkenhoff, 44 Hun 142 (N. Y. 1887); Squire v. Green, 38 App. Div. 431, 56 N. Y.
Supp. 551 (2d Dept. 1899).
'Holcomb v. Campbell, 118 N. Y. 46, 22 N. E. 1107 (1889); Schlitz v.
Koch, 138 App. Div. 535, 123 N. Y. Supp. 302 (2d Dept. 1910).
'Baker v. Met Life Ins. Co., 111 App. Div. 500, 97 N. Y. Supp. 1088
(1st Dept. 1906), aff'd, 187 N. Y. 562, 80 N. E. 1105 (1907); Sabin v. Grand
Lodge, 43 Hun 634 (N. Y. 1887); Eltonhead v. Travelers Ins. Co., mspra
note 1.
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involving opposing claimants to life insurance proceeds, but
these do not touch upon the question of admissibility under
section 347, C. P. A., either because it was not raised or,
being raised, was nevertheless not decided, a decision having
been arrived at on other grounds.
Although an attempt has been made herein to present
the decisions chronologically, a deviation will be made as to
the case of Martorella v. Prudential Life Insurance Company,28 a very recent case, because herein the court cites the
case of Ward v. New York Life Insurance Company and interprets it with regard to the question what constitutes privity in the law of admissions, although in the former an
interpretation of the terms "from, under or through," as used
in section 347 was not involved. It will be noted that
in relating briefly the facts in the Ward case specific mention
was made of the fact that originally the conflicting claimants
were not named as beneficiaries, the original beneficiary
being "the administrators, executors and assigns," in other
words, the estate of the insured. In the Martorella v. Prudential Life Insurance Company case, it does not clearly
appear that the beneficiary, who claimed the proceeds, was
the original one, although, perhaps, the following quotation
from the court's opinion would be a help. "She" (the insured) "could have named her own estate as beneficiary* *
As in the Ward case, however, the insured had a right to
change the beneficiary. The rest of the facts were a plea of
breach of condition subsequent to the issuance of the policy,
in that the insured took bichloride of mercury with the
intent to commit suicide. To sustain its defense the insurer
was permitted to offer proof of an oral statement made by
the insured after the issuance of the policy to the effect that
she had taken the poison because she did not care to live any
longer. In rebuttal of this proof the plaintiff was permitted
to offer evidence of other oral statements alleged to have
been made by the insured to the effect that she had taken the
poison by mistake. It was held that all the declarations
referred to were competent. The oral statements of the
insured, however, to the effect that she had taken poison
because she did not care to live, it was held, were not admis' Supra note 3.
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sible as "admissions" because "the insured," said the court,
citing the Ward case, "seems not to have been in privity in a
legal sense with the plaintiff, the beneficiary." It is to be
noted that in the Ward case the court did not even use the
term "privity." Nor did it expressly state that the terms
"from, under or through," as used in section 347, are
synonymous with or mean privity. The important point,
however, is that the Ward case should not have been cited
for another reason, namely, that if the terms "from, under
or through" mean or are synonymous with the term "privity," what may constitute privity under section 347 is
not controlling as to what constitutes privity in the law of
admissions. As is well known, the term "privity" is used
in many different senses or ways, depending upon the nature
of the situation to which a concept of it is sought to be
invoked or put into play.
No case or citation is given by the Martorell case,
which supports the proposition that the term "privity" as
used when section 347 is involved is applicable to a
situation in which it is not involved. Of significance, again,
is the fact that throughout the series of cases discussed in
this article which are the landmark cases in the field, at
least in this state, nowhere is consideration given to the
question whether the insured's declarations are "admissions"
or "declarations against interest," and it seems that the
Martorella case is the first to draw a line of demarcation.
Again, conceding for the purposes of argument that the
terms "from, under or through" as used in section 347,
C. P. A., are synonymous with the term privity, and that
there is justification in applying its connotation within that
section to a situation for which that section was not enacted
or meant to cover, still another criticism may be directed at
the Martorella case, namely, that it does not unequivocally
appear therein, whether, as in the prior case of Ward v.
New York Life Insurance Company (supra) which it invokes for the aforementioned proposition in regard to privity, the beneficiary or beneficiaries were or were not originally named in the policy.2 9 This being so, an additional
- See ante for a distinction between a case where policy is originally made
by A (insured), payable to B (beneficiary), and a case where A (insured)
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ground exists upon which to predicate the aforementioned
statement to the effect that the Ward case was not justifiably
cited.
But this is not all. There is yet a fourth. To wit, as
stated, anything that had been said by the court in the lastmentioned case in regard to section 347, C. P. A., was
not strictly necessary to the decision rendered therein.
Be this as it may, still another fact warrants specific
mention. Although the court in Martorella v. The Prudential Life Insurance Company said that the aforementioned
declarations were not admissible as "admissions" they, it
said, were nevertheless admissible as "declarations against
interest" because at the time when made the declarant (the
insured) had an interest, she already having procured the
policy and having reserved the right to change the beneficiary so as to enable her, if she wislied, to at any time constitute her estate as beneficiary. It is to be noted that the
court used the article "the" and not the indefinite article
"a" or the term "all" or even just the word "statements"
unqualifiedly, in referring to the declarations of the insured;
for were the court to state or intimate that all declarations
by an insured are "declarations against interest" and not
"admissions," a necessary concomitant would be to exclude
all declarations made by the insured before the issuance of
the policy, thus abrogating the well-established rule that
declarations made prior to acquiring an interest are not
against interest because an interest did not exist at the time
the declarations were made.30 Admissions, it is conceded,
need not be against the declarant's interest at the time the
declarations were madeA1 Were it the law that the declarations of an insured, without exception, are "declarations
against interest" and not "admissions," those cases heretofore discussed in which it appears that the insured's declarations were made before the issuance of the policy and the
makes a policy originally payable to himself or his estate and subsequently
changes the beneficiary in pursuance to provisions in the policy permitting
same, so that B becomes the ultimate beneficiary.

"' Hutchins v. Hutchins, 98 N. Y. 56 (1885);
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ed. 1931) 194.
"Mindlin v. Dorfmen, 197 App. Div. 770, 189 N. Y. Supp. 265 (1st Dept.
1921) ; RICHARDSON, EvmENcE, supra note 30, §§352, 295.
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applications for the same, would have excluded them; provided, they held there was a lack of privity between the
beneficiary and the insured, the presence or absence of privity being an element which they ignore.
By way of recapitulation, the law of this state in regard
to the admissibility of the declarations of an insured against
the beneficiary may be stated as follows:
I-The declarations of an insured as to his health
made before the issuance of the policy are admissible, even though the mere issuance of the policy
gives the beneficiary a vested interest, the rule
being such because at the time the declarations
were made the beneficiary did not have a vested
interest.
Il-The rule in regard to declarations made before
the issuance of the policy, however, is subject to
the following restrictions:
A-The declarations must not be too remote, a
period of approximately one year being
held not too remote.
B-The declarations must be in connection
with "facts" or "acts" exhibiting the insured's state of health; viz., limping, soreness, inability to move parts of the body
and other overt acts or manifestations of
disease or sickness.
C-A foundation must precede an attempt to
introduce the declarations in evidence,
apart from the declarations of the insured,
showing that the insured actually had the
disease in question.
D-The relevancy of the declarations arises on
the issue of knowledge by the insured of
the state of his health.
E-If the suit is brought on a policy of accident insurance and the insured is not dead,
it must either be shown that
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a-the declarations were made to a physician for the purpose of treatment
and that in such a case they were of
present pain and suffering;
b-or that they were made simultaneously with the infliction of the injury so as to be characterized "verbal
acts."
11-Declarations made after the issuance of a policy
are not admissible if the insured has not reserved
the right to change the beneficiary.
IV'-Declarations made after the issuance of a policy,
the insured reserving the right to change the
beneficiary, are admissible where they relate to
either a state of health, physical or mental, or
to an assignment of the policy or evince an intent
to defraud the insurer.
V-If the declarations are made after the issuance of
the policy, the remoteness of the declarations in
point of time is not referred to by the courts but
is ignored.
VI-Semble-If an insured has the policy originally
so drawn that it is payable to his estate and,
subsequently, by virtue of a reservation in the
policy giving him thie right to change the beneficiary and he does so, thereby constituting a third
person the beneficiary, the latter does not take
"from, under or through" the insured within the
meaning of section 347 of the Civil Practice
Act.
VII-Semble-Declarations of an insured made after
the issuance of a policy originally so drawn that
it is payable to the insured's estate and, subsequently, by virtue of a reservation in the policy
giving the insured the right to change the beneficiary, made payable to another, thereby constituting a third person beneficiary, are admissible as
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"declarations against interest" and not as "admissions."
VIII-Where declarations of an insured are made before
the issuance of the policy the courts do not make
a distinction between "declarations against interest" and "admissions." Accordingly, they have
been admitted even though at the time when made
the declarant had no interest, because part of
the "res gestae."
IX-The well-known principle enunciated by the case
of Paige v. Cagwin,32 and other decisions rendered in this state to the effect that the declarations of a donor, vendor or assignor of a chattel
or chose in action whether made before or after
the transfer are inadmissible to effect the claim
or title of the donee, vendee, assignee or any
subsequent holder is applied only where there is
no provision in the policy permitting a change of
beneficiary by the insured and the declarations
by him are made after its issuance.
GEORGE D. FINALE.
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